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SUmmARy
Peace diplomacy has been a Norwegian foreign policy priority ever since the 
early successes of the Oslo channel in the Middle East. Though the nineties were 
a golden decade for peace diplomacy, the situation changed after 11 September 
2001. Non-state parties to a number of internal conflicts have been labelled 
terrorist organizations, and the international community has tended to address 
such conflicts just as situations of one state fighting against terrorism. Instead, 
many internal, asymmetrical conflicts should be seen as cases of unfinished or 
incomplete state-building processes, and the international response should be 
one of supporting restructuring of the state to ensure all parts of society are 
included. This would require a willingness from governments to engage in asym-
metrical diplomacy, implying negotiation with terrorists.
 International anti-terrorism measures have significantly constrained ef-
forts to negotiate a peace. This has also had implications for Norway as its peace 
diplomacy has been caught between international anti-terrorism policies which 
it cannot influence, and peace diplomacy ambitions which it cannot live up to 
precisely because of the policies mentioned. This has led to the effectiveness and 
relevance of Norway’s peace diplomacy increasingly being called into question. 
In response, Norway should shape more comprehensive and less compartmen-
talized peace and security policies.
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INTRODUCTION
Peace diplomacy1 has played an increasingly important role in international af-
fairs since the end of the cold war and in Norway, successive governments have 
prioritized it in terms of their political efforts, public profile, and resource allo-
cation. To some extent it has become a Norwegian foreign policy “brand”2, and 
researchers have even suggested that Norway’s ambitions in this field are part of 
a mental nation-building exercise.3
What, then, has the impact been? Scrutiny of Norwegian peace diplomacy 
has been rather limited and patchy. The Oslo process has been the subject of 
one research project4 and several books of varying quality. Some researchers 
and journalists have criticized to some degree the nation’s individual peace ef-
forts and the very notion of peace diplomacy as a foreign policy priority. In a 
recent article Professor Øyvind Østerud at the University of Oslo claimed that 
the “idealistic halo” of this policy makes it difficult to assess its results critically.5 
Others have insisted that there is a lack of public scrutiny and debate because 
of a largely self-serving foreign policy establishment which seeks to avoid any 
such discussion.6 
Even though I cannot lay claim to any critical distance to the subject, in this 
essay I shall reflect on the impact of peace diplomacy.7 My main focus will be 
on how conditions for peace diplomacy have been affected by the international 
1 I will use this term, as well as the term “peace efforts”, to cover efforts to initiate,                 
promote, support, mediate and successfully conclude peace negotiations.
2 Mark �eonard,  Public Diplomacy (�ondon: The Foreign Policy Centre, June 2002).
3 The “Power and Democracy” research project 1998–2003 was initiated by the           
Norwegian parliament in order to study the state of Norwegian democracy. Its final 
report states that “�o�ver the last 10–12 years a massive, symbolic self-image has been           
built of Norway as an idealistic small country engaged in a huge effort for peace, 
human rights and development.” Øyvind Østerud, Fredrik Engelstad and Per Selle,       
Makten og demokratiet. �n sluttbok fra Makt�� og demokratiutredningen     , �Power and 
Democracy: A Final Report of the Power and Democracy Study� (Oslo: Gyldendal, 
2003), p. 266.
4 Hilde Henriksen Waage,   Peacemaking Is a Risky Business. Norway’s Role in the Peace 
Process in the Middle �ast, 1993–96, PRIO Report no. 1 (Oslo: International Peace 
Research Institute 2004).
5 Øyvind Østerud, “�ite land som humanitær stormakt?” �Small Country as          
Humanitarian Great Power?�, Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, vol. 4 (2006): 312. See 
also for example Olav Riste, ”Ideal og eigeninteresser: Utviklinga av den norske 
utanrikspolitiske tradisjonen” �Ideals and self interests: the development of 
the Norwegian foreign policy tradition�, in Motstrøms: Olav Riste og norsk 
historieskrivning �Against the Tide: Olav Riste and Norwegian historical research�, 
eds. Sven G. Holtsmark, Helge Ø. Pharo �� Rolf Tamnes, (Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk            
Forlag, 2003). 
6 Terje Tvedt,  Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt: Den norske modellen 
�Development Aid, Foreign Policy and Power: The Norwegian Model� (Oslo: 
Gyldendal Akademisk, 2003).
7 As Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 2001–05 I had responsibility           
for peace diplomacy, with an active role in several peace efforts, not least the peace 
process in Sri �anka. I prepared much of this essay in the last quarter 2005, but was 
not able to complete it before being consumed by new responsibilities. The opinions 
expressed here are entirely personal. 
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security context after 11 September 2001, and how Norway has responded and 
should respond. I shall seek to demonstrate that the success of peace diplomacy 
is to a great extent determined by global security realities often outside the con-
trol of warring or third parties. Today, the dominant global security issue is 
terrorism and the global efforts to combat it. As a founding member of NATO 
with a strong, transatlantic orientation, Norway has taken part actively in these 
efforts. I shall argue that international efforts against terrorism have not dif-
ferentiated sufficiently the threat of global terrorist networks from terrorism 
expressed in national contexts, and that measures against terrorism have been 
correspondingly inadequate. This flaw in the international response to terror-
ism has had an adverse impact on conditions for peace negotiations, including 
Norwegian peace diplomacy, making the resolution of internal conflicts more 
difficult. Facing this dilemma of competing policy areas has been a challenge for 
Norway. Institutional shortcomings, inadequate integration of policy-making 
processes and turf protection tendencies have hampered the possibilities to face 
the dilemma effectively. Furthermore, its non-membership of the European 
Union has barred Norway from influencing EU policies which have a severe 
impact on conditions for Norwegian peace diplomacy. These factors have made 
Norway’s resourceful and creative peace diplomacy less effective in contributing 
to international peace and security policies.
PEACE DIPLOmACy AS A mIRROR OF GLObAL REALITIES
Peace has been an international political aspiration ever since the Hague Peace 
Conference in 1899, an organizing principle for the international community 
since the inception of the �eague of Nations in 1919, and a legal aspiration 
since the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. The early part of the last century saw 
a remarkable process of the international codification of peace aspirations and 
regulation of war conduct, only to be followed by the bloodiest conflicts in the 
history of mankind. Two world wars inspired the adoption of the United Na-
tions Charter in 1945. The Charter reinforces the objective of world peace by 
virtue of provisions to make war an illegal instrument of state conduct and to 
establish mechanisms to enforce this legal regime. The underlying logic was self-
evident. War was seen mainly as an occurrence between sovereign states, and 
peace between states therefore required effective protection of state sovereignty, 
and correspondingly a strict principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs 
of states. 
This state-centered nature of international law and diplomacy has been 
rather successful in preventing, avoiding and resolving conflicts between states. 
Throughout the cold war period, however, an increasing proportion of conflicts 
appeared within states, not between them. Efforts were made by the interna-
tional community to address such conflicts, but these efforts were constrained 
by the principles and practices of international law and diplomacy with their 
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emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention. The very same principles and 
practices that had been designed to prevent conflict between states, rendered the 
international community ineffective in preventing conflict within states. Further-
more, throughout the cold war, intra-state conflicts tended to be seen as expres-
sions of East-West polarization. If the state was supported by the west, the rebel 
movement8 was often supported by the east and vice versa. This very fact implies 
that intra-state conflicts were and are not always fully internal; they regularly 
have international components even when the origins and visible parties to the 
conflict are internal. 
The cold war period was also marked by decolonization, and throughout 
this period movements long labelled terrorist ended up in government. While 
these were liberation processes which in principle were fought between the co-
lonial power and nationalist movements, they were often influenced by cold war 
rivalry. Hence the realities of the cold war restricted opportunities for peace 
diplomacy. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, international attention turned to the many 
intra-state conflicts in a different way. First, as the cold war lid had been removed 
from these simmering conflicts they could be assessed on their merits rather than 
on cold war politics. Secondly, the end to cold war politics enabled the interna-
tional community to address these conflicts with peace diplomacy efforts or even 
intervention. During the first half of the 1990s, the Security Council, which had 
largely been paralyzed since its inception, authorized unprecedented military 
interventions in what were predominantly internal conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, 
Rwanda and Haiti. 
The challenges and opportunities of the new international security environ-
ment were recognized not only in ad hoc decisions of the Security Council. The 
new security environment paved the way for a significantly broadened under-
standing of what constituted threats to the peace. At the first-ever summit meet-
ing of the UN Security Council, in itself an expression of a new era, the heads of 
state and government declared that: “The absence of war and military conflicts 
amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The 
non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and 
ecological fields have become threats to international peace and security.”9
PEACE DIPLOmACy’S “GOLDEN DECADE”
This was an important recognition; that peace and security were no longer a 
matter of conflict only between states, and no longer just a matter of military 
force. This new environment gave way to new approaches and actors in the 
8 I use the term rebel movement as a generic term, where I could have used guerillas,                
insurgents, militants, or other terms.
9 United Nations, Note by the President of the Security Council, S�23500, 31 January             
1993, p. 3.
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field of peace and security. As long as security was largely about military force, 
the state was traditionally in a monopolist position as a security actor. With the 
recognition of non-military sources of instability, came the increasing recogni-
tion of a role for non-state actors to address economic, social, humanitarian 
and ecological security concerns. Throughout the nineties, for better or worse, a 
proliferation of non-state actors ensued in the field of peace and security. Again, 
the global realities determined the framework for peace diplomacy. 
The most remarkable example was the role played by the Norwegian re-
search institute FAFO in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A survey of Palestinian 
living conditions triggered the process which led to the Oslo Agreement. It was 
seen as acceptable and even desirable that a non-governmental actor perform 
peace diplomacy on behalf of a government, and it was seen as laudable that 
it led negotiations with the previously terrorist-labelled Palestinian �iberation 
Organization (P�O).
Inspired by the early successes of the Oslo channel, successive Norwegian 
governments made peace diplomacy an explicit part of foreign policy, and they 
made partnerships with NGOs an essential vehicle with which to conduct such 
diplomacy in a number of areas, including the Middle East, Guatemala, Colom-
bia, Sudan, Sri �anka and the Philippines. Norway was not the only govern-
ment making peace diplomacy a priority. The Canadian, Swiss and Swedish 
governments also stepped up their support of peace efforts. Peace diplomacy has 
become a crowded field of governments, various UN actors not necessarily op-
erating in a coordinated fashion, national and international NGOs and research 
institutions. Media attention, political attention, and the amounts of aid money 
available, have contributed to a surge of NGOs in the fields of humanitarian as-
sistance, development, and conflict prevention and resolution. 
The increasing involvement of the international community in resolving 
internal conflicts, and the fact that much of this involvement is carried out by 
NGOs, are expressions of a process in which the nation-state is losing its mo-
nopoly to deal with peace and security. In several fields and by various means 
the state and borders between states are being challenged: by transnational com-
panies, NGOs, the Internet, and by “super-empowered individuals.”10 Even the 
very core of state functions, military defense, is outsourced today to an extent 
never seen since the Westphalia peace in 1648.11 In international policy doctrine 
and practice, traditional notions of state sovereignty have come under pressure 
from the advance of universal human rights principles. The concepts of human 
10 This phrase has been used by Thomas Friedman to illustrate how actions by             
individuals can have considerable impact on world politics or economies. See Thomas 
�. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 2000) pp. 
14–16.
11 For an intriguing survey of this development, see Peter W. Singer,           Corporate Warriors 
(�ondon: Cornell University Press, 2003).
security and the “responsibility to protect” have gained ground, as expressed in 
the Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly 2005.12 However, it re-
mains to be seen whether this trend will be sustained, given the repercussions of 
the Iraq war as well as new configurations of global and regional powers. There 
are signs that non-intervention is back in fashion. 
The weakened position of the state has a darker side: that of increased 
vulnerability. The advance of globalization means the easier flow of not only 
wealth and benefits but also of threats and risks, such as environmental crises, 
pandemics, and not least: global terrorism.
9/11 AND THE RETURN OF A DIFFERENT “COLD WAR”
The post cold war era was short lived as one of somewhat disorganized oppor-
tunity and optimism facilitated by globalization. The Rwanda genocide marked 
an end to the optimism, and 11 September 2001 marked the beginning of a new 
era. The fact that 9�11 fundamentally changed international affairs has become 
a truism. The notion of a single, huge threat returned as the organizing principle 
of foreign policy. Terrorism and the efforts to combat it came to dominate the 
agenda of international organizations and governments. The broader security 
concept which was recognized in the aftermath of the cold war, with its empha-
sis on the diversity of risks, suddenly became less relevant in international policy 
making processes. As the vulnerability of state institutions and state borders 
came to the fore, state security in a more narrow sense was back in focus. True, 
there were voices of reason which warned against forgetting the complexity of 
and interlinkages between global threats and risks. The “UN High �evel Panel 
on Challenges, Opportunities and Change” presented a convincing report to this 
effect.13 Nevertheless, the security agendas and the decision-making processes of 
the most influential governments and key international organizations like the 
UN, the EU and NATO were focused almost exclusively on terrorism and the 
need to combat it.14
Prioritizing fighting global terrorism has left little room in which to address 
other risks effectively. On the contrary, mechanisms long in place to address 
other risks have to some extent been put to use in an anti-terrorism context: 
even humanitarian and development assistance. It can reasonably be argued that 
terrorism has become policy making’s mental Berlin Wall: this is a major inter-
12 United Nations, United Nations General Assembly Resolution A�RES�60�1, 24         
October 2005.
13 United Nations,  A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, report of the High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 1 December 2004, United Nations 
General Assembly Doc A�59�565.
14 It can reasonably be argued that the Iraq war should not be categorized as a challenge                
of terrorism. However, it was pursued as such by the United States, and few could 
deny that today Iraq is a considerable problem of terrorism.
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individuals can have considerable impact on world politics or economies. See Thomas 
�. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 2000) pp. 
14–16.
11 For an intriguing survey of this development, see Peter W. Singer,           Corporate Warriors 
(�ondon: Cornell University Press, 2003).
security and the “responsibility to protect” have gained ground, as expressed in 
the Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly 2005.12 However, it re-
mains to be seen whether this trend will be sustained, given the repercussions of 
the Iraq war as well as new configurations of global and regional powers. There 
are signs that non-intervention is back in fashion. 
The weakened position of the state has a darker side: that of increased 
vulnerability. The advance of globalization means the easier flow of not only 
wealth and benefits but also of threats and risks, such as environmental crises, 
pandemics, and not least: global terrorism.
9/11 AND THE RETURN OF A DIFFERENT “COLD WAR”
The post cold war era was short lived as one of somewhat disorganized oppor-
tunity and optimism facilitated by globalization. The Rwanda genocide marked 
an end to the optimism, and 11 September 2001 marked the beginning of a new 
era. The fact that 9�11 fundamentally changed international affairs has become 
a truism. The notion of a single, huge threat returned as the organizing principle 
of foreign policy. Terrorism and the efforts to combat it came to dominate the 
agenda of international organizations and governments. The broader security 
concept which was recognized in the aftermath of the cold war, with its empha-
sis on the diversity of risks, suddenly became less relevant in international policy 
making processes. As the vulnerability of state institutions and state borders 
came to the fore, state security in a more narrow sense was back in focus. True, 
there were voices of reason which warned against forgetting the complexity of 
and interlinkages between global threats and risks. The “UN High �evel Panel 
on Challenges, Opportunities and Change” presented a convincing report to this 
effect.13 Nevertheless, the security agendas and the decision-making processes of 
the most influential governments and key international organizations like the 
UN, the EU and NATO were focused almost exclusively on terrorism and the 
need to combat it.14
Prioritizing fighting global terrorism has left little room in which to address 
other risks effectively. On the contrary, mechanisms long in place to address 
other risks have to some extent been put to use in an anti-terrorism context: 
even humanitarian and development assistance. It can reasonably be argued that 
terrorism has become policy making’s mental Berlin Wall: this is a major inter-
12 United Nations, United Nations General Assembly Resolution A�RES�60�1, 24         
October 2005.
13 United Nations,  A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, report of the High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 1 December 2004, United Nations 
General Assembly Doc A�59�565.
14 It can reasonably be argued that the Iraq war should not be categorized as a challenge                
of terrorism. However, it was pursued as such by the United States, and few could 
deny that today Iraq is a considerable problem of terrorism.
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national challenge in its own right, but it also tends to stand in the way of ad-
dressing a wide range of other challenges. 
It can also be argued that some expressions and repercussions of the global 
fight against terrorism have contributed to a degree of polarization not seen 
since the cold war. This polarization is evidenced by the “with us or against us” 
approach to diplomacy, the controversies of the process leading to war in Iraq, 
and grave violations of humanitarian law and human rights in the conduct of 
the so-called war on terrorism. The ideological drive by the US government to 
promote democracy has been seen as inconsistently applied to various regimes, 
thus triggering accusations of hidden agendas and double standards. Coupled 
with the exclusion of large parts of the world’s population from the gains of 
economic globalization, as marked by the unwillingness of richer countries to 
pursue a WTO agreement,15 it is not entirely unreasonable today to talk of a 
polarization no less profound than that of the cold war.
THE CONFUSION OF GLObAL AND NATIONAL TERRORISm
The effectiveness of the campaign against terrorism has been subject to much 
and heated debate. �ess attention has been given to the effects of the campaign 
on national terrorism situations. Global terrorism and national terrorism have 
been confused, or rather, not sufficiently differentiated. While it was global Al 
Qaida terrorism which necessitated new and dramatic responses by the interna-
tional community, there has been little reflection on whether the same kinds of 
responses are adequate against national terrorism, i.e. terrorism as an expres-
sion of national conflicts.
The purpose of this essay is not to address the highly divisive issue of the 
definition of terrorism. I shall merely refer to the definition proposed by the UN 
Secretary General in 2005: 
any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily 
harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a popu-
lation or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or 
abstain from doing any act.16 
Terrorism is a means of warfare often used by the non-state party in an asym-
metric conflict, as well as by global networks. But Al Qaida terrorism is different 
from the �iberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (�TTE) terrorism in Sri �anka. 
Many if not most internal conflicts include a rebel movement which applies 
15 As this script underwent its final reading, news came that the Doha round of WTO               
negotiations would be resumed.
16 United Nations,  In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights 
for all, report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, United Nations General 
Assembly Doc A�59�2005.
unacceptable methods of warfare which qualify as terrorism. In the era of global 
terrorism, asymmetrical conflicts at the national level have increasingly come to 
be seen through the prism of the global campaign against terrorism. While it is 
reasonable to argue that acts of terrorism are equally unjustified and worthy 
of condemnation in any situation, this should not automatically be translated 
into adopting equal policies to address terrorism of global and national natures, 
because the political underpinnings of terrorism are contextual and therefore 
different. 
Asymmetrical conflicts within states precede global terrorism. �ong be-
fore 11 September 2001, it was customary for governments to label rebel or 
opposition movements as terrorists, introduce national prevention of terrorism 
acts, and apply other anti-terrorism policies. Hence addressing internal conflicts 
from an anti-terrorism perspective is not new. However, since 9�11 nationally 
motivated policies and practices have conceptually been made part of the global 
campaign against terrorism. For the state facing a terrorist rebel group, this has 
provided an opportunity to mobilize the international community to support 
its national policies. It is a recognized fact that this has led to less human rights 
protection in many countries. It has also had an impact on efforts to bring about 
conflict resolution. When an internal conflict is treated as a case of terrorism, at-
tention is paid not so much to the dynamics of the conflict as to the tactics of ter-
rorists. It follows that the rebel movement using terrorist methods thus deprives 
itself of any legitimacy. Correspondingly the state, being the target of terrorist 
violence, easily wins the stamp of approval of the international community. As 
fighting terrorism is the single most important security objective of the interna-
tional community, a state defending itself against terrorism is often not under 
any pressure to justify its range of policies, and faces less harsh international 
reactions against the disproportionate use of force. On the contrary, the state 
is increasingly lent supportive action in the form of the rebels being listed in-
ternationally as terrorists, military or security assistance to fight terrorism, and 
measures to curb the flow of finances to territories controlled by the rebels. 
Given the unacceptable nature of terrorism and the importance to the 
world community of curbing terrorism, it is not necessarily unreasonable to 
view a conflict between a state and a rebel group as a conflict between a legiti-
mate and an illegitimate actor. Stopping at that, however, is not necessarily ef-
fective in bringing an end to conflict or an end to terrorism. 
ASymmETRICAL CONFLICTS AS UNFINISHED STATE-bUILDING
Most conflicts today which involve a group applying terrorist measures origi-
nated before 11 September 2001, and should be understood against a wider 
background than that of terrorism alone. Some conflicts can be traced back to 
the colonial era. Some have been caused or sustained by policies of exclusion 
or marginalization, or policies which deprive large segments of society of eco-
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tional community, there has been little reflection on whether the same kinds of 
responses are adequate against national terrorism, i.e. terrorism as an expres-
sion of national conflicts.
The purpose of this essay is not to address the highly divisive issue of the 
definition of terrorism. I shall merely refer to the definition proposed by the UN 
Secretary General in 2005: 
any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily 
harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a popu-
lation or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or 
abstain from doing any act.16 
Terrorism is a means of warfare often used by the non-state party in an asym-
metric conflict, as well as by global networks. But Al Qaida terrorism is different 
from the �iberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (�TTE) terrorism in Sri �anka. 
Many if not most internal conflicts include a rebel movement which applies 
15 As this script underwent its final reading, news came that the Doha round of WTO               
negotiations would be resumed.
16 United Nations,  In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights 
for all, report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, United Nations General 
Assembly Doc A�59�2005.
unacceptable methods of warfare which qualify as terrorism. In the era of global 
terrorism, asymmetrical conflicts at the national level have increasingly come to 
be seen through the prism of the global campaign against terrorism. While it is 
reasonable to argue that acts of terrorism are equally unjustified and worthy 
of condemnation in any situation, this should not automatically be translated 
into adopting equal policies to address terrorism of global and national natures, 
because the political underpinnings of terrorism are contextual and therefore 
different. 
Asymmetrical conflicts within states precede global terrorism. �ong be-
fore 11 September 2001, it was customary for governments to label rebel or 
opposition movements as terrorists, introduce national prevention of terrorism 
acts, and apply other anti-terrorism policies. Hence addressing internal conflicts 
from an anti-terrorism perspective is not new. However, since 9�11 nationally 
motivated policies and practices have conceptually been made part of the global 
campaign against terrorism. For the state facing a terrorist rebel group, this has 
provided an opportunity to mobilize the international community to support 
its national policies. It is a recognized fact that this has led to less human rights 
protection in many countries. It has also had an impact on efforts to bring about 
conflict resolution. When an internal conflict is treated as a case of terrorism, at-
tention is paid not so much to the dynamics of the conflict as to the tactics of ter-
rorists. It follows that the rebel movement using terrorist methods thus deprives 
itself of any legitimacy. Correspondingly the state, being the target of terrorist 
violence, easily wins the stamp of approval of the international community. As 
fighting terrorism is the single most important security objective of the interna-
tional community, a state defending itself against terrorism is often not under 
any pressure to justify its range of policies, and faces less harsh international 
reactions against the disproportionate use of force. On the contrary, the state 
is increasingly lent supportive action in the form of the rebels being listed in-
ternationally as terrorists, military or security assistance to fight terrorism, and 
measures to curb the flow of finances to territories controlled by the rebels. 
Given the unacceptable nature of terrorism and the importance to the 
world community of curbing terrorism, it is not necessarily unreasonable to 
view a conflict between a state and a rebel group as a conflict between a legiti-
mate and an illegitimate actor. Stopping at that, however, is not necessarily ef-
fective in bringing an end to conflict or an end to terrorism. 
ASymmETRICAL CONFLICTS AS UNFINISHED STATE-bUILDING
Most conflicts today which involve a group applying terrorist measures origi-
nated before 11 September 2001, and should be understood against a wider 
background than that of terrorism alone. Some conflicts can be traced back to 
the colonial era. Some have been caused or sustained by policies of exclusion 
or marginalization, or policies which deprive large segments of society of eco-
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nomic opportunity. Whether it be Sudan, Northern Uganda, Sri �anka, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Colombia, the Philippines, Somalia, Iraq, or Palestine, a variety of 
such factors combine to determine the nature of the conflict. Addressing such 
conflicts mainly as situations of a state fighting against terrorism will not facili-
tate resolution.
A different and arguably more adequate perspective on asymmetrical con-
flicts would be to see them as cases of unfinished or incomplete state-building 
processes. Emerging from the colonial era, newly independent states often failed 
to resolve internal conflicts that had been kept in check, ignored, or even abused 
by the colonial power. Relative stability may have been maintained for dec-
ades after liberation due to individual leaders who commanded wide respect as 
liberators, or also due to policies of repression, division or deprivation. Such 
policies rarely remove the underlying problems, however. In some situations 
the rebel movement can be seen as representing people or groups of people that 
were not fully or fairly incorporated into or by the state. Such groups may have 
turned violent over time, not infrequently because the state, instead of resolving 
the problems, exacerbated them due to continued policies of discrimination, 
marginalization, exclusion or polarization. 
As conflicts have political causes, they need to be resolved by politi-
cal means. If the international community addresses such conflicts with anti-
terrorism policies that do not only seek to limit or put an end to terrorist actions, 
but that also limit or put an end to opportunities for dialogue, then the interna-
tional community risks exacerbating the conflict by reinforcing what created it 
in the first place: the exclusion of groups from political participation and influ-
ence. Military action, economic sanctions, or diplomatic and political isolation 
may risk increasing and entrenching the problems that were part of the reason 
for the groups taking up terrorism. 
The issue is not whether or not to go easy on terrorism. It is which policies 
are likely to work. Sometimes heavy-handed responses are necessary. The fact 
cannot be ignored that terrorist groups may have developed vested interests in 
criminal activities, even though such activities were not part of their motivation 
from the outset. Such vested interests can perpetuate conflict, and they need to 
be addressed. However, it is difficult to imagine resolving the conflict that cre-
ated terrorism just by addressing the terrorist expressions of the conflict. Its po-
litical underpinnings must be dealt with at some point, via a political process. 
If one accepts that many internal, asymmetrical conflicts may be regarded 
as unfinished or incomplete state-building processes, then the international re-
sponse should be to support restructuring the state to ensure all parts of society 
are included. This process would not get off to a good start if groups viewed as 
representing marginalized groups were excluded from dialogue from the out-
set. 
Recent examples can be cited that international isolationist policies on rebel 
movements and terrorist groups have not necessarily helped resolve conflict. It 
can reasonably be argued that the Sri �ankan government’s refusal for several 
years to allow the international community to engage with the �iberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (�TTE), and that the international community accepted this 
refusal, helped bring about a range of miscalculations by the �TTE leadership 
which entrenched the conflict. The EU’s terrorist listing of the �TTE has add-
ed to the isolation and probably exacerbated these miscalculations. Regarding 
the Philippines, the EU’s terrorist listing of the communist New People’s Army 
has for years been the single, repeated excuse for the communists not return-
ing to negotiations. The complexities of terrorist listing were also demonstrated 
throughout the “democratic revolution” in Nepal in the spring of 2006. When 
the Maoists started taking part in transitional negotiations with the Nepalese 
government, several countries were still not able to engage with them, due to 
national policies enacted against the Maoists which could not quickly and easily 
be amended.
THE NEED FOR ASymmETRIC DIPLOmACy
One might argue that if asymmetric conflicts are to be resolved then asymmetric 
diplomacy is needed, meaning that states should learn to negotiate with terror-
ists. When dealing with internal conflicts, international actors should go a long 
way to engage with the rebel movement, even if it applies terrorist tactics. Such 
engagement should pursue a number of aims. First, one should seek to gain a 
better understanding of the political rationale and constituencies of the rebel 
movement. Second, one should seek to make the rebel movement understand, by 
allowing it to experience it in the process, that political engagement is the best 
way to achieve political objectives. Third, one should effectively communicate 
the need for the movement to cease its terrorist activities. 
Only if foreign states are themselves willing to engage with terrorists, can 
they have enough credibility to insist that the government in conflict should 
negotiate. Effective pressure on a government to participate in a peace proc-
ess cannot be applied credibly if the international community refuses to engage 
with rebel movements. For a rebel movement to see merit in political dialogue, 
the state with which it is at conflict must make politics look an attractive and 
serious means of reaching political objectives. In dialogue with governments, 
the international community should encourage reforms which can complete the 
unfinished state-building process and make democratic politics inclusive of and 
attractive to the segments of the population that have been excluded. 
Policies and practices of non-engagement have also proven to be prob-
lematic in the most critical of today’s conflicts. The first war against global ter-
rorism in Afghanistan brought about the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. In 
the immediate aftermath, there were those who advocated the need to engage 
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flicts would be to see them as cases of unfinished or incomplete state-building 
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the rebel movement can be seen as representing people or groups of people that 
were not fully or fairly incorporated into or by the state. Such groups may have 
turned violent over time, not infrequently because the state, instead of resolving 
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are likely to work. Sometimes heavy-handed responses are necessary. The fact 
cannot be ignored that terrorist groups may have developed vested interests in 
criminal activities, even though such activities were not part of their motivation 
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ated terrorism just by addressing the terrorist expressions of the conflict. Its po-
litical underpinnings must be dealt with at some point, via a political process. 
If one accepts that many internal, asymmetrical conflicts may be regarded 
as unfinished or incomplete state-building processes, then the international re-
sponse should be to support restructuring the state to ensure all parts of society 
are included. This process would not get off to a good start if groups viewed as 
representing marginalized groups were excluded from dialogue from the out-
set. 
Recent examples can be cited that international isolationist policies on rebel 
movements and terrorist groups have not necessarily helped resolve conflict. It 
can reasonably be argued that the Sri �ankan government’s refusal for several 
years to allow the international community to engage with the �iberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (�TTE), and that the international community accepted this 
refusal, helped bring about a range of miscalculations by the �TTE leadership 
which entrenched the conflict. The EU’s terrorist listing of the �TTE has add-
ed to the isolation and probably exacerbated these miscalculations. Regarding 
the Philippines, the EU’s terrorist listing of the communist New People’s Army 
has for years been the single, repeated excuse for the communists not return-
ing to negotiations. The complexities of terrorist listing were also demonstrated 
throughout the “democratic revolution” in Nepal in the spring of 2006. When 
the Maoists started taking part in transitional negotiations with the Nepalese 
government, several countries were still not able to engage with them, due to 
national policies enacted against the Maoists which could not quickly and easily 
be amended.
THE NEED FOR ASymmETRIC DIPLOmACy
One might argue that if asymmetric conflicts are to be resolved then asymmetric 
diplomacy is needed, meaning that states should learn to negotiate with terror-
ists. When dealing with internal conflicts, international actors should go a long 
way to engage with the rebel movement, even if it applies terrorist tactics. Such 
engagement should pursue a number of aims. First, one should seek to gain a 
better understanding of the political rationale and constituencies of the rebel 
movement. Second, one should seek to make the rebel movement understand, by 
allowing it to experience it in the process, that political engagement is the best 
way to achieve political objectives. Third, one should effectively communicate 
the need for the movement to cease its terrorist activities. 
Only if foreign states are themselves willing to engage with terrorists, can 
they have enough credibility to insist that the government in conflict should 
negotiate. Effective pressure on a government to participate in a peace proc-
ess cannot be applied credibly if the international community refuses to engage 
with rebel movements. For a rebel movement to see merit in political dialogue, 
the state with which it is at conflict must make politics look an attractive and 
serious means of reaching political objectives. In dialogue with governments, 
the international community should encourage reforms which can complete the 
unfinished state-building process and make democratic politics inclusive of and 
attractive to the segments of the population that have been excluded. 
Policies and practices of non-engagement have also proven to be prob-
lematic in the most critical of today’s conflicts. The first war against global ter-
rorism in Afghanistan brought about the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. In 
the immediate aftermath, there were those who advocated the need to engage 
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politically with the so-called moderate Taliban. However, the US-led coalition 
ruled this out, claiming in part that there was no such thing as moderate Tali-
ban. But this approach changed over time. On a visit to Afghanistan in 2003 
as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, I was asked by �akhdar Brahimi, the 
UN Special Representative, whether Norway might play a role in facilitating 
dialogue with moderate Taliban elements. Though Norway acquiesced to this 
request, it proved difficult, and it is likely that much would have been gained by 
adopting such a dialogue-oriented approach early on following the fall of the 
Taliban in 2001, while the Taliban were much weakened. 
Similarly, in Iraq, no one today would reasonably contest that the policy of 
“de-Baathification” after the fall of the Saddam Hussein’s regime and the Baath 
party contributed to the catastrophe now unfolding there.17 In Palestine, the 
issue of whether to engage in dialogue with the present coalition government, 
the Hamas government before it, and the Fatah government before that, is an 
unfinished story of incoherent approaches by different international actors. 
NORWAy: bETWEEN mULTILATERAL LOyALTIES AND PEACE AmbITIONS
The Hamas issue is the most striking example of how new global realities have 
led to a more difficult position for Norwegian peace diplomacy: The government 
which succeeded in getting Israeli politicians to talk to the terrorist-labelled P�O 
in 1993 has today itself not been able to talk to the terrorist-labelled Hamas 
government of the Palestinian Authority. This resulted from Norway aligning 
itself with EU and US policies. Norway is caught between international anti-
terrorism policies which it cannot influence and peace diplomacy ambitions it 
cannot live up to precisely because of the policies mentioned. Independent ac-
tion by Norway, such as engaging with the Hamas-Fatah coalition government, 
risks provoking harsh reactions – neither does it necessarily amount to effective 
peace diplomacy.18 
The contrast is striking to the way Norway was able to exploit in full the 
opportunities offered by the post cold war situation 15 years ago to make peace 
diplomacy a foreign policy priority. Ever since the Oslo Channel, a number of 
peace initiatives were supported, e.g. in Guatemala, Colombia, Sudan, Sri �anka 
and the Philippines. In today’s “age of terrorism” with its new constraints on 
peace diplomacy, Norway is struggling to square the circle of being a loyal team 
player helping to demonstrate a united international front against terrorism, 
while at the same time wanting to support negotiated solutions to conflicts in 
which one party has been labelled a terrorist organization. 
17 See, for example, Bob Woodward,     State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: 
Simon �� Schuster, 2006).
18 The news that the Norwegian government would establish relations with the           
Palestinian coalition government, came as this essay went to print.
Against this backdrop, what might the way forward be for Norwegian 
peace diplomacy? Some critics seem to be suggesting that Norway’s efforts have 
in any case been futile and might as well cease. Østerud suggests that studies 
demonstrate that lasting peace is more likely following the victory of one party 
to a civil war than following a negotiated settlement. 19 As a static observation 
of the period since 1945, this is correct. Throughout the cold war period, 93 
armed conflicts ended in victory while less than half as many, 45, ended in ne-
gotiated settlements. In recent times this situation has changed fundamentally. 
In the nineties, 23 ended in victory and 42 in negotiated settlements. True, the 
negotiated settlements have a high rate of failure, as 18 of the 42 conflicts had 
restarted within 5 years.20 Nevertheless, during the nineties there were 24 suc-
cessful negotiated settlements, compared to 21 successful conflict terminations 
as a result of victories. In one third of conflicts recorded after the cold war, the 
parties to conflict concluded peace agreements.21 Hence, drawing the conclusion 
that negotiations are fruitless is erroneous. 
Østerud also seems to be suggesting that international engagement can be 
counterproductive, and it may even prolong conflicts.22 While this may have been 
the case in individual conflicts, it is not a generally valid observation. Barbara 
Walter’s 2002 study of the successful settlement of civil wars concludes that 
between 1940 and 1992, “if a third party assisted with implementation, negotia-
tions almost always succeeded.”23 Østerud also overlooks the fact that in many 
civil wars, the outright victory of one side is simply not a military possibility. 
However, it is apparent that many peace processes, peace agreements and 
implementation mechanisms are poorly designed. As peace mediation is such a 
new field, this should come as no surprise, but much effort is being directed into 
research into and analysis of how to improve the quality of such processes.24 
The most recent global research on negotiated settlements may suggest 
that Norwegian efforts have been relatively unsuccessful, as far as lasting peace 
agreements go. If one takes a long-term, state building perspective on conflict 
resolution, however, it is simplistic to say that the breakdown of a peace agree-
19 Øyvind Østerud, “�ite land som humanitær stormakt?” �Small Country as          
Humanitarian Great Power?�, Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, vol. 4 (2006): 311.
20 Human Security Centre,   Human Security Brief 2006 (University of British Columbia, 
Canada), p. 20.
21 �otta Harbom, Stina H�gbladh �� Peter Wallensteen, ”Armed Conflicts and Peace           
Agreements”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 43, no. 5 (2006): 617–631.
22 Øyvind Østerud, “�ite land som humanitær stormakt?” �Small Country as          
Humanitarian Great Power?�, Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, vol. 4 (2006): 310.
23 Barbara F. Walter,   Committing to Peace: the Successful Settlement of Civil Wars 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) p. 11.
24 When the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated, in collaboration          
with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, an annual “Mediators’ Retreat” in 
2003, it was the first meeting of its kind, testifying to the pioneer nature of peace 
mediation. Furthermore, the establishment the same year of a Section for Peace and 
Reconciliation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was also an effort to move beyond 
individual engagements and shape better policies based on lessons learnt.
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ruled this out, claiming in part that there was no such thing as moderate Tali-
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request, it proved difficult, and it is likely that much would have been gained by 
adopting such a dialogue-oriented approach early on following the fall of the 
Taliban in 2001, while the Taliban were much weakened. 
Similarly, in Iraq, no one today would reasonably contest that the policy of 
“de-Baathification” after the fall of the Saddam Hussein’s regime and the Baath 
party contributed to the catastrophe now unfolding there.17 In Palestine, the 
issue of whether to engage in dialogue with the present coalition government, 
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17 See, for example, Bob Woodward,     State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: 
Simon �� Schuster, 2006).
18 The news that the Norwegian government would establish relations with the           
Palestinian coalition government, came as this essay went to print.
Against this backdrop, what might the way forward be for Norwegian 
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19 Øyvind Østerud, “�ite land som humanitær stormakt?” �Small Country as          
Humanitarian Great Power?�, Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, vol. 4 (2006): 311.
20 Human Security Centre,   Human Security Brief 2006 (University of British Columbia, 
Canada), p. 20.
21 �otta Harbom, Stina H�gbladh �� Peter Wallensteen, ”Armed Conflicts and Peace           
Agreements”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 43, no. 5 (2006): 617–631.
22 Øyvind Østerud, “�ite land som humanitær stormakt?” �Small Country as          
Humanitarian Great Power?�, Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, vol. 4 (2006): 310.
23 Barbara F. Walter,   Committing to Peace: the Successful Settlement of Civil Wars 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) p. 11.
24 When the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated, in collaboration          
with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, an annual “Mediators’ Retreat” in 
2003, it was the first meeting of its kind, testifying to the pioneer nature of peace 
mediation. Furthermore, the establishment the same year of a Section for Peace and 
Reconciliation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was also an effort to move beyond 
individual engagements and shape better policies based on lessons learnt.
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ment proves the entire effort futile. Even if an individual peace initiative fails, 
there may be lessons learnt, or institutions built, that can be important for lat-
er efforts. As an example, the very existence today of a Palestinian Authority, 
thanks to the Oslo Agreements, has changed the dynamics of the Middle East 
Peace Process in a lasting way.
This is not to say that Norwegian diplomacy could not have been con-
ducted more productively. In the Oslo process, failing to establish international 
monitoring of the agreements probably helped derail the peace process. Israel 
flatly rejected proposals for such monitoring, and Norway was in no position 
to pressure the Israeli government. Norwegian mediators might, however, have 
called on the U.S, which at the time was far more willing than today to apply 
conditions to its support to Israel. As the US administration had not taken the 
Oslo process that seriously from the outset, Norwegian facilitators did not ef-
fectively try to engage the US administration in the final phases of the secret 
negotiations, which were apparently marked by rather uncompromising Israeli 
positions. If the US had been effectively engaged, however, then one cannot rule 
out that monitoring arrangements could have been worked out. In Sri �anka, 
Norwegian efforts should probably have been more sharply focused on much 
needed reform agendas as part of the architecture of the peace process both 
within the Sri �ankan state and the �TTE.
PEACE DIPLOmACy AS A SIDE SHOW
While there are failures of Norwegian peace efforts from which lessons should 
be learned, there are also strengths that should be maintained and built upon. 
The Norwegian approach to peace facilitation has involved innovative and crea-
tive diplomacy. The traditionally risk-averse diplomatic culture, still prevalent 
in other parts of Norwegian Foreign Service, has given way to a trial and error 
approach in the field of supporting peace and reconciliation initiatives. There 
is extensive use of partnerships with non-governmental organizations, at times 
using such organizations more or less as agents of foreign policy while main-
taining official “deniability” during secret phases of a peace process. In this lies 
an understanding that the different phases of peace processes require different 
actors and actions, and a readiness to act flexibly and apply the resources neces-
sary to manage just that. Humanitarian and development aid budgets are used 
flexibly to create and sustain constituencies for peace, even including catering 
for the individual needs of key actors in peace processes. A separate budget line 
for “peace and reconciliation” as well as a special unit have been established to 
support the politics and practicalities of peace processes. An important enabling 
factor was the high degree of commitment and time spent by political level of-
ficials. This direct engagement of politicians has facilitated fast decision-making, 
regularly short-cutting the normal lines of reporting of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Above all, the ability to sustain setbacks results from the broad political 
support for peace diplomacy, and correspondingly an understanding in Parlia-
ment of the need for flexibility and creativity when managing this particular field 
of diplomacy. 
However, although peace diplomacy is a priority, there has been a misper-
ception, fuelled by individual politicians as well as the media that it occupies 
centre stage of Norwegian foreign policy. Evidently, the foreign policy of any 
country must prioritize immediate, national interests. For Norway, vital inter-
ests are not least at stake in two fields. First, the energy, environmental and se-
curity concerns in the high north, and the challenging relationship with Russia, 
including the unresolved maritime border issue. Second, Norway’s outsider role 
in Europe as it is not a member of the EU, the equally pressing need to sustain 
a strong transatlantic relationship with the US, and the need to keep NATO rel-
evant as the only regional security alliance of which Norway is a member. These 
two challenges are related, as the somewhat lonely position of Norway in the 
high north prompts the need for strong alliances with Europe and�or the US. 
Compared to these vital interests, peace facilitation efforts may seem mar-
ginal. I would argue that they are not, but some advocates of peace efforts have 
regrettably and unwillingly helped make peace diplomacy seem a side show 
performed by do-gooders on the margins of foreign policy. A policy to sup-
port peace initiatives comes with the risk of national self-glorification which in 
turn makes peace efforts an easy target for cynics. While there have been some 
remarkable achievements, the Oslo Agreements first among them, politicians 
have not always resisted the temptation to use these to overestimate Norway’s 
international role. Portraying Norway as a nation of peace, or a humanitarian 
great power, may be possible to grasp in a national context and for domestic 
political purposes. But such statements risk being self-defeating as they can cre-
ate the impression that peace diplomacy is part of a national branding exercise. 
More detrimental still is the position held by some that there is a contradiction 
between playing an active role in supporting peace processes and engaging in 
international military operations. This is a view of peace efforts as an alterna-
tive or even a countermeasure to other key elements of foreign policy. Advocates 
of such positions have argued that Norway should reduce or halt participation 
in international military and security operations, and instead concentrate its ef-
forts on humanitarian, development and peace and reconciliation efforts. Such 
approaches, if enacted, would be counterproductive. As shown by the impact 
of the global campaign against terrorism on asymmetrical conflicts, opportuni-
ties for peace diplomacy depend heavily on the global security environment. If 
Norwegian peace efforts are to produce achievements over and above national 
pretentiousness, they should not be pursued in isolation. On the contrary, peace 
and reconciliation efforts should be incorporated into comprehensive peace and 
security policies. First, there is a need for such a comprehensive approach to be 
formed between different players within the Norwegian government. Second, 
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with comprehensive policies Norway should, aim to contribute more effectively 
to international policies that influence conditions for peace diplomacy. 
THE NEED TO mAINSTREAm PEACE DIPLOmACy
Many of today’s internal conflicts, including those in which Norway has had a 
special interest in terms of peace and reconciliation, have regional or even global 
links that go to the heart of security challenges in the global era. The Horn of 
Africa (e.g. Sudan and Somalia) has been an area in which Norway has been 
especially interested, while this area has also been feared as a breeding ground 
for terrorist networks. Afghanistan is Norway’s biggest development partner, 
and also the country in which Norway makes its greatest NATO troop contri-
butions. The Palestinian Authority, its existence resulting from the Oslo Agree-
ments, is another major development partner. Even the Sri �ankan conflict, while 
national in origin, has repercussions not least in terms of international criminal 
networks. Resolving such internal conflicts would serve the international com-
munity well, but cannot be achieved through international “one-size-fits-all” 
policies. A deep understanding of the nature of asymmetrical internal conflict 
dynamics is required, as well as knowledge of the national political and military 
actors. Norway possesses considerable resources and experience from a variety 
of such conflicts. Nevertheless, the lessons learnt have not been effectively trans-
formed into policies which Norway can advance in the relevant international 
contexts. If Norway is to enhance the impact of its diplomatic and material con-
tributions to peace and security, shifts are needed in Norwegian foreign policy 
making processes and in Norway’s international engagement. 
Nationally, bureaucratic traditionalism and turf-protection tendencies 
must be addressed. To start with, the “peace community” and the “security 
community” need to interact as foreign policy development is disturbingly com-
partmentalized. At the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, security policy is 
largely dealt with as an extension of transatlantic relations. This obviously re-
sults from NATO being the pillar of Norway’s security policies, and of the USA 
being by far the most important member of NATO. The fact that NATO is a glo-
bal player today, with Afghanistan its most important theatre of operations, is 
a profound change. However, though security challenges have been globalized, 
national policy making continues to be compartmentalized. With Afghanistan 
categorized as largely an anti-terrorism and NATO issue post 9�11, Norwegian 
policy making suffered from a bureaucratic compartmentalization in which the 
relevant knowledge about Afghanistan and its vicinity, or about the dynamics of 
conflict and peace building, was insufficiently made use of: it was largely left to 
diplomats with experience of NATO as a transatlantic actor. Bureaucratically, 
too, the era of global terrorism reactivated too much of a cold war culture in 
which security policy is defined as much by the nature of transatlantic relations 
as by the new global realities such as those on the ground in Afghanistan.
The effect of this bureaucratic policy entrenchment should not be blamed 
on the “security establishment”. The “development establishment” is no less 
marked by bureaucratic turf and traditionalism which hamper new approaches 
to global security challenges. Though acknowledging conceptually the impor-
tance of the so-called security and development nexus, the development commu-
nity has consistently been reluctant to use development aid resources on security 
related development activities. Again, turf protection tendencies prevail.25 
So what is needed? Policy and decision making processes which are not 
driven by sectoral perspectives and turf interests, but which capture the com��
plexities of present-day conflicts and acknowledge the time needed to resolve 
them. In policy making, where you stand depends on where you sit. If you take 
the perspective of transatlantic relations, you can shape an apparently consistent 
policy to deal with the world from that perspective. If you take the perspective 
of poverty eradication, you can shape a different policy which seems equally 
consistent. If your perspective is one of trade, or anti-terrorism, or environmen-
tal challenges, or culture and religion, the same applies. However, in today’s 
globalized world the reality is that you need to be able to capture all these and 
more to understand the global picture of risks and threats and address risks 
and threats to prevent or resolve conflict. This is an almost insurmountable 
challenge for political and diplomatic processes, as there is a demand for ever-
faster decision-making relating to conflict situations of ever-increasing complex-
ity. However, when issues of peace, state and democracy building are at hand, 
one lesson that can be learned from past failures and successes is that proper 
processes take time. This has been witnessed in Norwegian and other nations’ 
peace efforts. The desire to rush towards results and have a rapid impact may be 
detrimental. Ambitious timetables drawn up at conferences by governments or 
at military headquarters are often out of touch with the realities on the ground 
in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, the Middle East, the Balkans and else-
where. 
INTEGRATING NORWEGIAN PEACE DIPLOmACy WITH INTERNATIONAL REALITIES 
For a small state like Norway, shaping foreign policies and making decisions are 
not predominantly a matter of domestic policy. In an unpredictable world, it is 
fundamentally in Norway’s interests to build lasting alliances and partnerships 
that can be drawn upon when needs arise. Integrating Norwegian policies with 
25 Such tendencies are not a uniquely Norwegian phenomenon. In Sweden the           
development community, spearheaded by the development agency SIDA, is even 
more remote from the foreign and security policy development than in Norway. The 
compartmentalization in US foreign policy has been highlighted by several books, 
see footnote 23. In the UK, on the other hand, efforts have been made at improving 
interaction between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defense 
and the Department for International Development, including through pooling of 
resources for country interventions.
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those of international partners is therefore necessary. Peace diplomacy should be 
no exception. Hence Norwegian efforts to shape more coherent national policies 
should serve the purpose of more effectively contributing to international peace 
and security policy making. 
Peace diplomacy is one area in which Norway can claim some unique ex-
periences. Apart from the great powers, it is unlikely that any other government 
has the same level of experience of conducting peace negotiations in secret or 
in the public eye as Norway. Probably no other government has maintained 
contact with so many rebel movements and leaders, and accumulated such an 
understanding of their mentality, political outlook and organizations. Norway’s 
ability and willingness to engage and interact with such organizations could 
be a useful contribution to international policy and decision-making processes 
in conflict situations. All the most deadly of today’s conflicts have asymmetric 
elements, and the sad state of most of these conflicts calls for creative, non-
doctrinal and a result-oriented approach to conflict resolution. Such approaches 
seem by no means to be in abundance in the major players’ policy-making pro-
cesses.26 Norway has a proven ability for creative diplomacy which should be 
used more systematically and effectively to help shape international peace and 
security responses. 
To begin with, Norway should help form a more comprehensive NATO 
peace and security approach. The success of NATO operations in asymmetri-
cal conflicts depends to a great extent on non-military components. While this 
has been conceptually recognized, there are serious shortcomings when mak-
ing these concepts operational. The purpose of military force is to win wars, 
but more and more often military forces have to try to consolidate peace and 
development, tasks for which other actors are far more qualified. The concept 
of “winning hearts and minds” has at times been implemented in a way which 
leads to a confusion of military and humanitarian actors, accompanied by the 
risk of compromising the much needed neutrality and impartiality of humani-
tarian assistance. There are also inconsistencies in security approaches on the 
ground. In those situations where NATO action is most needed today, the way 
operations are conducted can determine long-term success or failure, such as 
taking the cultural and religious context into account when planning and carry-
ing out operations. Reports from NATO operations in Afghanistan indicate less 
than satisfactory practices in this regard which suggests the need for improve-
ments at the policy-making level as well in the rules of engagement. 
Norway has a strong national interest in maintaining NATO as a relevant 
security actor – but it also has an interest in maintaining it as a forum for trans-
26 For sweeping accounts of US foreign policy decision making under the Bush Sr,             
Clinton and Bush Jr administrations, see David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: 
Bush, Clinton and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001) and Bob Woodward, State 
of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon �� Schuster, 2006).
atlantic dialogue for peace and security political issues. More actively seeking to 
contribute to better NATO policies would be in line with this national interest. 
Given the purposes and functions of NATO, however, actively influencing its 
policy-making processes is not just academic. Actual and significant contribu-
tions to NATO operations are a prerequisite for influence. 
Although a broader approach to peace and security should be supported 
and advocated , NATO is still a security organization which operates at the mili-
tary end of international peace and security engagement. The European Union 
(EU), on the other hand, has the policy-making potential, budgetary capacity and 
diplomatic reach to address the complexities of present-day asymmetrical con-
flicts. For all its inability to utilize its potential effectively, the EU is an actor with 
a greater degree of coherence and far more resources than other international 
actors, and also has a Security Strategy committed to using these resources to 
support effective multilateralism and strengthen the UN’s role. Today the world 
faces the urgent challenge of finding more effective policy responses to threats 
and risks such as terrorism and asymmetrical conflicts, and given the incapac-
ity of even large-scale military approaches to these threats and risks, there is a 
need for leadership in identifying better policies and practices. The continued 
strength of the USA and the rise of powerful actors in Asia will certainly provide 
candidates for global leadership, but if Europe is to be positioned in this field, 
the EU is the only candidate. 
A Norwegian strategy to use better its resourcefulness in peace diplomacy 
with the aim of improving international peace policies for peace would neither 
becomplete nor coherent unless there were a much more systematic engagement 
with the EU regarding policy formulation and the execution of such. While EU 
policies have a decisive impact on the conditions for Norwegian peace diplo-
macy, Norway has but very limited impact on EU policies. A case in point is 
the designation of rebel movements as terrorist organizations, which has had a 
profound impact on Norwegian peace efforts in Sri �anka and the Philippines. 
The practice of terrorist listing effectively disables EU member states – they 
cannot play key roles in certain conflict resolution processes. From the perspec-
tive of narrow self-interest, Norway can capitalize on not being bound by these 
policies by enhancing its position and profile as an honest broker. This does, 
however, not add an inch of influence to the conditions for the peace processes 
in countries like the Philippines or Sri �anka. A different situation proving the 
same point relates to the difficult issue of how to treat the Hamas and Hamas�
Fatah governments in the Palestinian territories. The freedom which Norway 
formally enjoys by not aligning itself with the EU’s list of terrorist organizations 
has not led it to adopt fundamentally different approaches than those of the EU 
member states’ governments. And when it does, it tends to weaken rather than 
strengthen Norway’s influence. 
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and risks such as terrorism and asymmetrical conflicts, and given the incapac-
ity of even large-scale military approaches to these threats and risks, there is a 
need for leadership in identifying better policies and practices. The continued 
strength of the USA and the rise of powerful actors in Asia will certainly provide 
candidates for global leadership, but if Europe is to be positioned in this field, 
the EU is the only candidate. 
A Norwegian strategy to use better its resourcefulness in peace diplomacy 
with the aim of improving international peace policies for peace would neither 
becomplete nor coherent unless there were a much more systematic engagement 
with the EU regarding policy formulation and the execution of such. While EU 
policies have a decisive impact on the conditions for Norwegian peace diplo-
macy, Norway has but very limited impact on EU policies. A case in point is 
the designation of rebel movements as terrorist organizations, which has had a 
profound impact on Norwegian peace efforts in Sri �anka and the Philippines. 
The practice of terrorist listing effectively disables EU member states – they 
cannot play key roles in certain conflict resolution processes. From the perspec-
tive of narrow self-interest, Norway can capitalize on not being bound by these 
policies by enhancing its position and profile as an honest broker. This does, 
however, not add an inch of influence to the conditions for the peace processes 
in countries like the Philippines or Sri �anka. A different situation proving the 
same point relates to the difficult issue of how to treat the Hamas and Hamas�
Fatah governments in the Palestinian territories. The freedom which Norway 
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member states’ governments. And when it does, it tends to weaken rather than 
strengthen Norway’s influence. 
22 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurITy
As peace diplomacy is a foreign policy priority for Norway, it should be 
conducted not only on the basis of good intentions but with a considerable de-
gree of realism. While there have been certain achievements, Norway’s efforts 
at peace diplomacy are demonstrably constrained today by policies and deci-
sions beyond Norway’s influence. A more effective Norwegian role in promot-
ing peace and security will require Norway to influence NATO and EU policy 
formulation and execution more effectively. Achieving this depends on political 
choices well beyond symbolic gestures of peace diplomacy. 
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